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 The 1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit was a Big Success. 
Can a Tax Credit for Employment Growth in 2009 and 2010  
Restore Animal Spirits and help Jump Start the Economy? 
 
John H. Bishop, NYSSILR, Cornell University 
jhb5@ cornell.edu, 607-227-0329 
 
In the last three months employment declined by 1.2 million jobs and the number of part time 
workers who want but cannot find full-time work increased by 1.5 million.   We are in a downward spiral 
that John Thain of Merrill Lynch predicts will be compared with 1929-33.  Economists of all stripes (eg. 
Martin Feldstein, Larry Summers, Nouriel Roubini, Edmund Phelps, Paul Krugman, Brad Setzer) are 
recommending a massive temporary fiscal stimulus of 4 percent of GDP or more.  Investments in 
infrastructure, renewable energy, and energy efficiency are preferred because they raise future 
productivity.  Many worry, however, that infrastructure projects alone cannot quickly generate the $600 
billion stimulus that many believe is necessary?1  Last summer’s tax rebate provided little stimulus.  
Other guns must be brought to the battlefield.  We need a cost effective way of rekindling the animal 
spirits of the nation’s six million employers and fourteen million self-employed entrepreneurs.   
Foreseeing this, Barack Obama promised during the campaign to establish a $3000 per new hire 
tax credit for businesses that expand their U.S. employment in 2009 and 2010.  The scheme appears to be 
similar to the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) that accelerated the nation’s recovery from the 1975 
recession.  In 1977 and 1978 firms that increased employment by at least 2 percent received a tax credit of 
50% of the increase in each employer’s FUTA wage base (sum of wages paid up to $4200 per employee) 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act above 102 percent of the previous year’s FUTA wage base.  
Jobs tax credits like the 1977-78 NJTC are much more likely to stimulate entrepreneurship and 
job creation than accelerated depreciation of labor saving equipment and SUVs or cuts in the top marginal 
tax rate.  New firms always compete at a disadvantage because they lack established reputations with 
bankers and customers, need to recruit and train a new workforce and typically have inexperienced 
managers.  When a NJTC is in operation, however, new firms have one compensating advantage.  They 
have a zero threshold, so every worker they employ during their first year in business generates a tax 
credit that significantly lowers operating costs.  The Ways and Means committee thought new firms might 
get too big an advantage from this feature, so they limited the NJTC credit to be no more than 25 percent 
of current year FUTA wages.  For firms in their first year of operation, this effectively cut the tax benefit 
of hiring additional workers in half to $1050.  
The employer’s deduction for wages was reduced by the amount of the credit.  Consequently, the 
marginal wage and salary cost of employing additional non-supervisory workers at an existing firm 
(earning the mean weekly wage) was reduced by 21 percent.  The proportionate subsidy was about 45 
percent for additional part time workers and for full time workers paid the minimum wage.   
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 The NJTC was not signed into law until June 1977 and the Treasury and other public agencies did 
little to publicize and promote it.  Consequently many small employers were not aware that expanding 
employment would reduce their tax liability.2  A National Federation of Independent Business survey 
found that only 43 percent of their members knew of the credit in January 1978.  By July 1978, 68 percent 
were aware of the credit and 4.1 percent said they had increased employment (by an average of 2.3 
workers) in part because of it.  If these NFIB respondents are representative, multiplying these figures by 
3.5 million (the total number of employers in 1977), produces an estimate for July 1978 of about 300,000 
extra jobs created as a result of the NJTC (McKevitt 1978).  A Bureau of the Census survey of a stratified 
random sample of firms achieved a much higher response rate than the NFIB survey.  The Census 
survey’s estimate of employer awareness of the NJTC and of the response to it were also larger.  Perloff 
and Wachter (1979) used the Census data to compare the rates of employment growth in 1976 and 1977 
of firms that knew about the credit and those that did not.  Controlling for sales growth and other firm 
characteristics, they found that the employment of the firms that had already heard of the credit had 
grown three percent faster in the preceding year than at the firms that were unaware of it.  If you multiply 
the 3 percent figure by employment at small firms that knew about the credit, the total number of extra 
jobs in February 1978 was roughly 700,000.  Since NJTC passed Congress only 9 months before, this 
would be an impressive number.  Perloff and Wachter viewed their results “as an upper bound on the 
short run impact of the program” because some of the firms may have learned about the credit because 
they were growing rapidly.   
Another source of uncertainty about the size of the aggregate stimulus comes from the knock-on 
effects of one firm’s expansion on suppliers, distributors and competitors and the effect of reduced 
marginal costs on pricing and sales.  Many of these displacement effects are netted out when industries 
(not firms) are the units of observation, so interrupted time series studies of industry employment are 
potentially informative.  Bishop and Haveman’s time series analysis of employment in construction and 
distribution industries from 1952 through the third quarter of 1978 concluded that employment growth 
had accelerated during the 15 month period following the passage of the New Jobs Tax Credit legislation 
(Bishop 1981, Bishop and Havemen 1979).  Consistent with theory, NJTC’s ‘impacts were larger for 
part-time jobs than full-time jobs.3  Hours worked per week in retailing fell in 1978.  Theory predicts that 
a temporary marginal employment subsidy should lower marginal costs and increase price competition.  
Bishop (1981) found that margins between retail and wholesale prices in restaurants and other labor 
intensive retail sectors were declining during 1977-78. 
Private employment grew by an impressive 7.4 million jobs or 11.1 percent during the two year 
period (December 1976 to December 1978) the NJTC was in effect (see figure 1 and 2).  Only entry into 
World War 2 and the subsequent demobilization generated higher two-year rates of private job growth.  
Figure 3 shows that industries not eligible for the NJTC—government and private colleges and  
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 universities-- grew at a significantly lower rate during 1977 and 1978 (the two darkest bars).  Growth was 
particularly rapid in industries with many small firms: 18 percent in construction, 10.9 percent in retail 
trade, 10.8 percent in professional and business services and 11.2 percent in physicians offices.  A 
limitation of $100,000 on the amount of the credit any one firm could receive reduced its incentive effects 
for very large firms.  Consistent with that hypothesis, growth rates in 1977 and 1978 (the two darkest bars 
in figure 4) were lower in industries dominated by large firms--6.6 percent for utilities and 8 percent for 
manufacturing.  The unemployment rate which had stagnated between 7.6 and 7.9 percent in 1976 
dropped two percentage points to 5.9 percent in the final quarter of 1978 (figure 1).    
What happened after the NJTC expired in December 1978?  The growth of private employment 
slowed to 1.8 percent during the next six months and then stopped altogether.  By the third quarter of 
1980, the unemployment rate had returned to its 1976 level of 7.7 percent.  Was this due in part to an 
unwinding of the NJTC’s employment stimulus?  Possibly, but we will never know because the American 
economy experienced two huge shocks—a doubling of oil prices (after the February 1979 Iranian 
Revolution) and the Federal Reserve’s adoption of a tight monetary policy on October 1979—that would 
defeat any effort to tease out the effect of a NJTC phase out.  Manufacturing employment reached an all 
time peak of 19,553,000 (seasonally adjusted) in June 1979.  It then declined by 252,000 in the next six 
months, by another 661,000 during the subsequent 12 months and then by additional 1,950,000 by 
December 1982.   Unemployment reached 10.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 1982.   
Overall, about 1.1 million of the nation’s 3.5 million employers (probably more than half of 
profitable eligible firms) claimed a credit on their 1978 return.  The face value of the 1978 credits claimed 
was $4.513 billion for a net cost of roughly $3.1 billion dollars (a 0.69 percent reduction in federal tax 
revenue in 1978) or about 0.13 percent of GDP in that year.   
Extrapolating from Bishop (1981) and Perloff and Wachter (1979), the NJTC probably generated 
at least a million jobs by the end of 1978.   The average earnings of non-supervisory workers was 
$10,946, so adding a million jobs increased total labor compensation (including fringe benefits, pension 
contributions and the employer share of SSA taxes) by roughly 13.5 billion dollars.  That would make the 
first-round bang-for-buck about 4.35 to 1.  If the marginal propensity to consume U.S. goods and services 
out of total compensation is 0.50, the Keynsian multiplier for the 1977-78 NJTC would be about 8.7, 
more than five times Mark Zandy’s (2008) estimate of 1.59 for the infrastructure multiplier.   
Despite its implementation problems, the 1977-78 NJTC apparently had substantial effects on 
employment growth.  Would a marginal employment subsidy implemented in 2009 and 2010 be as 
successful?  Conditions are different.  We are now heading into a recession trough, not climbing out of 
one.  The problem is stag-deflation, not the stag-inflation of the 1970s and early 80s.  Many credit 
markets are frozen.  Skeptics would ask “How will entrepreneurs finance additional employees, if credit 
is unavailable.”  But external financing was also a big problem in 1977 and 1978.   The cost of equity 
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 capital—the earnings to share price ratio of the S&P500--was 10.8% in 1977 and 12.0% in 1978  
compared to 7.8% at the end of November 2008 .  Interest rates on Baa rated corporate bonds were also 
higher in 1977 than in November 2008.  The most important difference between now and 1977-78 is that 
we can incorporate the lessons of the 1977-78 experience in the design of a 2009-10 NJTC.  
Designing an Effective New Jobs Tax Credit for 2009-10 
The credit needs to be a significant share of labor costs.  The 1977/78 NJTC credit eventually 
attracted considerable employer participation in part because its $2100 face value was a substantial share 
of wages (22 percent of the annual earnings of a typical non supervisory worker in 1977 and an even 
larger share of wages of part-time and minimum wage workers).  Wages and prices have tripled since 
1977, so the advertised face value of the NJTC for 2009-2010 needs to be larger than $3000 to grab the 
attention of employers.  NIPA wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employee will be about 
$52,800 in 2009.  If the 2009 NJTC were 12.4 percent of the increase in social security wages over XX % 
of its level in 2008, it would be $6550 for full-time full-year workers paid the average wage.   
A Jobs Tax Credit should not favor low-wage high-turnover firms.  Firms that increase the 
number of well paid full-time jobs should receive larger NJTC credits than firms that expand part-time 
and low pay jobs.  Since data is available on the Social Security tax base (sum of wages and salaries up to 
$102,000 per employee), there is no need to use FUTA wages to measure employment for a 2009-2010 
NJTC.  If growth of FUTA wages were used for calculating the jobs tax credit, we would be encouraging 
firms to expand by hiring more part timers rather than by allowing current part timers to switch to full 
time work.   
Making the credit depend on the number of new hires would also be unwise.  It might induce 
some companies to layoff many of their workers in December 2008 or January 2009, so that the 
replacements they hire in March 2009 would make them eligible for a larger jobs credit.  It would also 
give low-wage high-turnover firms a big advantage over firms that keep turnover low by paying well and 
treating employees with respect. 
Restricting the Jobs Tax Credit to new hires with certain characteristics would also be unwise.  
Evaluations of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit that replaced the NJTC in 1979 concluded that many firms 
refused to give hiring preference to targeted individuals.  They made sure their hiring selections were not 
influenced by out-sourcing the task of determining which new hires were eligible and sending in the 
applications for a tax credit (Bishop and Montgomery 1986, 1993).   
The Jobs Credit should attempt to forestall employment contractions as well as promote 
employment growth.  We are heading into a severe recession, so a reasonable threshold for 2009 might 
be something like 95 percent of the 2008 social security wage base.  This would result in most firms 
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 getting a Jobs Tax Credit of some size and spread the stimulus over a larger number of employers.  A 
broad based jobs credit is also likely to garner more political support.   
There should be no absolute dollar cap on the amount of 2009-10 Jobs Tax Credit a firm 
can receive.  The 1977-78 NJTC, unfortunately, placed a $100,000 cap on the size of the credit any 
company could get.  This meant that once a firm added 50 employees, there was no further tax benefit 
from growing employment by another 100 or another 500 workers.  This feature reduced the impact of the 
NJTC on employment.  Reducing the new firm advantage by limiting total NJTC tax credits to 6.4 
percent of Social Security Wages avoids the problems of the absolute dollar cap.   
The threshold for the 2010 job tax credit should be based on 2008 employment levels.  The 
threshold level should be considerably higher (5, 8 or 10 percent higher than the 2009 threshold). 
Eligibility for the 2010 tax credit should not be affected by the firm’s 2009 social security wage base.  If 
it were, firms would have an incentive to reduce employment in 2009 in order to lower their subsidy 
threshold for 2010 (Bishop and Wilson 1982).  This would undermine the purpose of the job stimulus.  
Decisions about 2011 should be postponed to December 2010.  
 
How much will it cost?  How many additional jobs will it stimulate? 
I developed a simple spreadsheet model of the cost and job stimulus effects of a New Jobs Tax 
Credit that reduces the marginal cost of labor by 10 percent when a firm’s 2009 wage bill exceeds 95 
percent of its 2008 wage bill.  Since wage rates are projected to increase by 3 percent next year, any firm 
that avoids a U.S. employment decline of 8 percent or more would be eligible for a jobs tax credit that is 
roughly proportional to the amount by which the firm’s 2009 employment exceeds the 8 percent decline 
threshold. 
Rates of employment growth or decline vary across firms.  I assume that the standard deviation of 
wage bill growth is .14 from 2008 to 2009 and .16 from 2008 to 2010.  With a 95% of 2008 wage bill 
threshold, 72.6 percent of firms are eligible to receive a jobs tax credit in 2009.4  If the threshold for 2010 
is simply exceeding the firm’s 2008 wage bill, 68 percent of firms are projected to be in the subsidy zone 
in 2010.  
Hammermesh’s (1976) literature review concluded that the short run wage elasticity of labor 
demand was -.15.  That means that the 12.4% of social security wages (10% of compensation) jobs tax 
credit will induce the firms in the zone of subsidy to increase private employment by 1.5 percent or 
roughly 1.2 million jobs.  The cost and impact simulations results for a 2009-10 NJTC are presented in 
Table 1(also available as an attachment). The Jobs Credit reduces tax revenue by $45.2 billion (0.316 % 
of GDP) in 2009 and increases labor compensation at these firms by $77.8 billion dollars for a first round 
bang per buck of 1.72.  In 2010 revenue is reduced by $54.35 billion and labor compensation is increased 
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by $78.7 billion for a first round bang for buck of 1.45.  The added workers spend about half of their 
compensation on domestically produced goods and services and this creates still more jobs and so on and 
on.  The resulting Keynsian multiplier for the NJTC tax expenditure ends up being 3.44 in 2009 and 2.9 
in 2010—considerably larger than Mark Zandy’s estimate of the infrastructure multiplier.  Our 
simulations imply that the jobs credit boosts GDP by 1.086 percent in 2009 and 1.036 percent in 2010 
when the spending multiplier is 2.0.  These estimates of cost effectiveness will become smaller if the 
variation of growth rates across firms is greater than assumed and/or the wage elasticity of labor demand 
is lower than Hammermesh’s estimate.   
In simulations a 2009 NJTC with a lower threshold (90% of the firms 2008 wage bill) slightly 
increases the share of firms in the zone of subsidy and the number of jobs created.  The lower threshold, 
however, increases the revenue cost of the program by $17.7 billion.  This is more than double the extra 
compensation paid to the additional workers hired because more firms participated in the program.  This 
implies that setting a lower threshold is not a cost-efficient way of generating more jobs.  The cost 
effective way of raising the employment impact of the jobs credit is to increase the generosity of the 
subsidy from 12.4 percent to say 18.6 percent of social security wages.  The 95% threshold simulation 
model predicts that the increase in generosity has an incremental first round bang for buck of 1.45 and 
reduces the overall bang for buck from 1.72 to 1.62.   
Probably the most important recommendation for maximizing the cost effectiveness of a 2009-10 
jobs tax credit is to get it passed in January 2009 and to mount an effective marketing campaign 
informing employers that no matter how many workers they add to their work force they will not have to 
pay more social security taxes in 2009 than 95 percent of the social security taxes they paid in 2008.5   A 
simple online simulator allowing proprietors to calculate how much tax credit they would get under 
different employment growth scenarios would be a helpful teaching tool.  The IRS could also require that 
firms send an expression of interest in NJTC (either on line or as part of a quarterly employment tax 
return) before September 2009.   
 Table 1----Simulation of the Cost and Impact of a NJTC 
for 2009 and 2010      
Year 
Threshold 
and 
StdDev of 
growth & 
size of 
NJTC 
GDP 
w/o 
stimulus 
'billions' 
Baseline 
Nominal 
Private 
Industry 
Compen- 
sation 
Baseline 
Nominal 
Private 
industry   
W & S 
Base for 
NJTC if 
threshold 
XX % of 
2008 
(billions) 
Revenue 
cost of 
NJTC 
S=.124 
recap=.3 
(billions) 
Incr 
Priv 
Indust    
Comp 
Elast =    
-.15  
(billions)  
First 
Round 
Bang 
per 
Buck 
Extra 
FTE 
Jobs in 
'000s 
1st Round 
Cost per 
job. Cost 
is half this 
if 
Keynsian 
multiplier  
Revenue 
cost of 
NJTC 
divided 
by 
baseline 
GDP 
Keynsian 
Multiplier 
% impact 
of NJTC 
on 
baseline 
GDP   
2006 actual 13,178 6,105.1 5,004.2            
2007 actual 13,808 6,656.3 5,456.0         
2008 actual 14,326 6,710.0 5,500.0         
 Baseline simulation           
2009 T=95% SD=.14 14,326 6,710.0 5,500.0 520.957 45.219 77.785 1.720 1207.8 $37,438 0.316% 1.086% 
2010 T=100 SD=.16 15,193 7,116.0 5,833.0 626.128 54.348 78.716 1.448 1185.5 $45,844 0.358% 1.036% 
 Lower growth threshold by 5 percentage points        
2009 T=90% SD=.14 14,326 6,710.0 5,500.0 724.754 62.909 85.892 1.365 1333.7 $47,168 0.439% 1.199% 
2010 T=95% SD=.16 15,193 7,116.0 5,833.0 823.982 71.522 88.521 1.238 1333.1 $53,649 0.471% 1.165% 
 Increase NJTC by 50%           
2009 T=95 SD=.14 14,326 6,710.0 5,500.0 552.836 71.979 116.68 1.621 1811.8 $39,729 0.502% 1.629% 
2010 T=100 SD=.16 15,193 7,116.0 5,833.0 658.39 85.722 118.08 1.377 1778.2 $48,206 0.564% 1.554% 
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Endnotes 
 
1   Federal, state and local governments spent a total of 270 billion dollars on constructing and renovating 
schools, buildings, roads and other infrastructure in 2006 (BEA, I/O tables).  A 50 percent increase in all 
construction funded through state and local government would create 150 billion dollar of first round 
stimulus.  What would a green energy agenda add to this total?  In 2007 wind farms added 5,329 
megawatts of generation capacity to the nation’s electrical grid.  Developers have announced plans to 
increase wind generation capacity by 225,000 megawatts over the next decade.  If all of these projects are 
completed in the next decade , wind will generate 14 percent of electricity consumed in the US in 2020 
and a number of coal fired power plants will probably be decommissioned (Wiser and Bolinger 2008).  It 
requires a quadrupling of rates of investment in wind power, but that adds only $27 billion dollars a year 
to infrastructure investments.  The electricity transmission grid will need upgrading but technological 
advances have reduced the cost of capacity additions.  We can inexpensively double the capacity of 
existing transmission corridors by rewiring them with ACCC (Aluminum Conductor Composite Core) 
cables that use high strength carbon fiber cores to prevent sagging when transmission rates are high.   
2    During 1977 and the first three months of 1978, the majority of small employers were unaware of 
NJTC’s existence.  Some of these firms expanded employment nevertheless.  When their accountant did 
taxes in spring 1978, the firm applied for and received the credit even though it had not influenced the 
decision to expand.  Early employer ignorance of the NJTC reduced the impact of the credit on 
employment growth without a corresponding reduction in cost.    
3    This was predicted by Bishop and Lerman’s (1977) simulation model allowing for substitution 
between different types of workers to predict the effects of the 1977-78 NJTC.  First round bangs per 
buck were quite high and low wage and part-time jobs grew more rapidly than full-time jobs paying 
average and above wage rates (Bishop and Lerman 1977). 
 
4   From August to November private employment was declining at a 4.4% annual rate.  The simulation 
assumes that absent a NJTC total hours worked in the private sector will fall 3% from calendar 2008 to 
2009 and wage rates will rise 3% producing no change in total wage and salary payments.  The simulation 
for 2010 assumes that without a NJTC employment will return to it’s 2008 level and aggregate wages and 
salaries will be 6 % higher than in 2008.  
5  The jobs tax credit should be featured in the President’s inauguration address and marketed to local 
print and television media, industrial development agencies, local politicians, accountants, business and 
management consultants, tax-preparation services and of course employers. A web site should be created 
where proprietors and CEOs can complete a short on-line form expressing interest in receiving a NJTC 
for expanding employment.  The web site should also provide a simulator allowing managers to predict 
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the NJTC they would receive under alternative employment growth scenarios.  Tax accountants 
completing tax returns at the end of the year should not be the only ones who understand the incentives 
created by the NJTC.  
